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The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to
use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed
within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment
and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.
Int.-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, par. 174.
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INTRODUCTION
United States government policy and rhetoric assert that the United States need not ratify
additional international human rights instruments, accept the jurisdiction of international human
rights oversight bodies or directly enforce international human rights standards, because the
domestic legal system in this country adequately protects against abuses without recourse to
external legal standards or pressure. The claim is that the United States Constitution prohibits
violations of all of those rights which are treated as central in the various international human
rights instruments. Because domestic law provides all the protection that is needed, the
argument goes, the United States need not take on international human rights obligations.
However, this position is severely undercut by the inability of many victims to obtain
redress when governmental actors in the United States violate constitutional rights.
Unfortunately, while United States substantive law does include strong civil rights standards that
match those found in international human rights law, the United States legal system
simultaneously includes grave impediments to rights protection. One of the most serious
impediments to the enforcement of human rights in the United States is the broad application of
1
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sovereign immunity to prevent liability or even suit against federal, state and local governments
and their officials. United States sovereign immunity rules, which include absolute sovereign
immunity for the government as well as qualified immunity for individual officials, protect
governmental actors from suit in a broad swath of cases.2 As a result, victims of constitutional
violations are often left without an opportunity to obtain compensation for the harm they have
suffered and civil rights protections are inadequately enforced.
The contours of sovereign immunity will be discussed in detail below, but the case of
Petta v. Rivera3 provides an example of the breadth of the protection provided to governmental
actors. Petta denied compensation to two children victimized by a law enforcement official.
Melinda Petta was driving on a rural road with her daughter, age 7, and son, age 3, when she was
stopped for speeding by a Texas Department of Public Safety highway patrolman. Rather than
issuing a ticket, the officer ordered Petta to step out of the vehicle. Nervous, she refused. The
officer reacted by screaming and cursing and attempting to smash the driver’s side window with
a nightstick. When the officer pulled out his .357 Magnum and waved it menacingly at the
family, Petta drove away in fear. The officer shot at her as she pulled out and then engaged in a
high-speed pursuit during which he shot at the car again.
Petta brought suit on her children’s behalf against the Texas Public Department of Public
Safety and the officer, alleging constitutional violations under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
2

I use the label of sovereign immunity to reference the sovereign immunity structure that encompasses both
sovereign immunity for governments and qualified immunity for government officials. Scholarly discussions often
treat sovereign immunity for the federal government, state sovereign immunity based loosely on the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution, and qualified immunity for federal, state and local officials as distinct subjects. For
purposes of this article, they are treated as different components of an overall sovereign immunity system. As will
be discussed further below, they all derive from the same baseline theory that the government, the “sovereign,”
should enjoy special protections against liability, and they work together to form a patchwork of barriers to suit
ensuring that the limitations on governmental liability are real and vigorous. These immunities that fall under the
umbrella of “sovereign immunity” differ from other immunities in that they broadly and generally wrap almost all
governmental activity in protection on the mere basis that it is governmental, without regard to the specific type of
activity or actor involved. They thus differ from the immunity provided to discrete categories of government
officials based on their specific roles or functions (e.g. absolute presidential, judicial and prosecutorial immunities).
3
143 F.3d 895 (5th Cir. 1998).
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Act of 1871 (“Section 1983”), which is the main vehicle for litigating constitutional claims
against state and local governmental actors. All claims against the government were dismissed
because of the broad sovereign immunity available to the state, completely precluding any
possibility to pursue damages directly against the government. The claims against the individual
officer then came before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which decided
that qualified immunity foreclosed those claims. The Fifth Circuit found that the officer’s
actions could be considered grossly disproportionate to the need for action and concluded that
the officer’s actions violated the due process rights of the children under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court nonetheless concluded that the officer
was entitled to qualified immunity, because at the time of the incident, the law in the Fifth
Circuit did not make clear that an officer could be liable for a Fourteenth Amendment violation
where the victim of abuse suffered only psychological injury. Despite the egregiousness nature
of the officer’s behavior, his two young victims were denied any right to compensation for the
constitutional harm they suffered.4
While a number of scholars have criticized sovereign immunity as a problematic anomaly
in the United States constitutional system,5 the application of this doctrine as an impediment to
human rights protection in the United States has not been analyzed. This Article asserts that,
because the operation of sovereign immunity leaves many victims of constitutional violations
unprotected, United States civil rights law cannot be said to stand in for human rights
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Id. at 270-71. A case involving the same actions by a federal official would likely have resulted in the same
outcome. As will be discussed in detail below, the federal government itself would be held to enjoy absolute
governmental immunity from suits based on constitutional violations, and the individual officer would be entitled to
the same qualified immunity applicable to state actors. In theory, a claim could be brought against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), but that suit might well be dismissed on the basis of the discretionary
function exception or because the facts of the case do not neatly fit into any state law tort category.
5
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201 (2001); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment
Schizophrenia, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 859 (2000).
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protections. International human rights law seeks to protect individuals against abuses by
governments. The United States system, through the operation of broad sovereign immunity
doctrines, instead protects the government against individuals who lay claim to redress for
abuses they have suffered.
Section I of this article sets forth the claim that the United States civil rights norms,
embodied principally in the Constitution, largely parallel the central human rights standards
embodied in international law. It is therefore appropriate to analyze the United States civil rights
system to determine whether it provides sufficient protections so as to make it unnecessary for
the United States to take on additional international human rights commitments. If it is to be
treated as an adequate human rights protection system, the civil rights regime in the United
States must ensure that the rights set forth in the United States Constitution have meaning and
that violations of those rights are promptly and appropriately addressed. The current reality is
that sovereign immunity severely restricts human rights protection in this country.
Section II describes the application of sovereign immunity in United States law. The
Section looks at both absolute sovereign immunity from suit generally afforded to the federal
government and the states as well as the qualified immunity enjoyed by governmental officials.
This Section explains that, while it is theoretically possible to overcome governmental immunity
in many cases by suing individual officials, qualified immunity also constitutes a major
impediment for victims seeking to obtain a remedy for violations of their rights. The gap
between right and remedy is real and severe.
Section III then analyzes the United States system for civil rights protection, which
includes the application of sovereign immunity, from an international human rights law
perspective. The Section sets forth the basic goal of international human rights law as protecting
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individuals from abuse by government. It then lays out the requirement that an effective human
rights system must provide for a remedy, including compensation, where the government
commits abuses. More specifically, governmental immunities from liability are unacceptable
limitations on human rights. When measured against these tests for an effective human rights
system, the United States civil rights system fails miserably.
In Section IV, this Article provides a basis for comparison of the governmental liability
regime in the United States with legal systems elsewhere. The comparison demonstrates that
some national legal systems have eschewed grants of sovereign immunity. These countries have
provided greater human rights protections without any serious negative consequences for their
legal systems. The comparative law exercise suggests that the United States could and should
take a path away from sovereign immunity in cases involving human rights claims.
Section V recommends specifically that the United States not apply sovereign immunity
rules, including both governmental immunity and qualified immunity for its officials, to
constitutional tort claims. Only in this manner will the United States provide an effective human
rights protection system.
The focus of this Article is on the ability of individuals to access United States courts
when they suffer abuses at the hands of the government that can be characterized as civil rights
violations under United States domestic law. It does not address the desirability of making
available to litigants claims based directly on international human rights law. 6 Instead, the
Articles takes on its face the argument supporting the adequacy of the civil rights system as a
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substitute for human rights protections and proceeds on those terms to demonstrate the
shortcomings in the United States civil rights legal regime.
Nor does the Article seek to analyze any of the issues surrounding litigation in United
States courts against non-United States government actors for human rights abuses. It looks only
at the possibilities for addressing abuses committed by United States governmental actors
(federal, state and local) in United States courts. As a result, it does not include any discussion
of the doctrines of sovereign immunity that apply in cases involving suits against foreign
governmental actors in the tribunals of another country, including for example act of state
immunity doctrines and the immunities available to foreign governments under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. Those doctrines are separate and distinct from the sovereign
immunity doctrines that United States governmental actors have claimed for themselves in their
home courts and involve foreign policy justifications not applicable in the context of domestic
sovereign immunity in the United States.
I.

The United States’ Claim to an Effective Domestic Human Rights System
The United States7 argues that modern international human rights conceptions developed

out of and as a result of the Bill of Rights protections first developed in the Constitution of this
country. The United States asserts that its historic human rights standards are the best and need
not be supplemented by the newer worldwide human rights structure.8

7

This Article references the United States’ position on human rights without making distinctions, except as
necessary, regarding the specific branches of government that have acted or made pronouncements establishing this
position. For the purpose of a human rights discussion, the State as such is the relevant actor. While the various
branches speak with different voices, they all represent the State. Of course, the most relevant branches of the
United States government on international issues, including human rights, are the executive and legislative.
8
See, e.g., U.N. H. R. Committee, Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting: United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Mar. 31, 1995) (reflecting statement by John Shattuck, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,
that the United States’ deep commitment to civil liberties was demonstrated by its “long and often painful struggle
fully to achieve them” and that the United States system of laws and practices allowed “greater freedom than
required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [(“ICCPR”)]”); Letter from the Head of the
Delegation of the United States of America to the 54th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
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A.

United States Civil Rights are Human Rights

In the United States, the protections against abuses contained in the Constitution are
known as civil rights rather than human rights. Lawyers and non-lawyers alike cling to this
distinction in terms. In fact, civil rights lawyers working within the United States legal system
and human rights lawyers working in international fora may be the most adamant about refusing
to use the two terms interchangeably and to see the commonalities in civil rights and human
rights work.9
However, civil rights are, in fact, human rights. If the semantic difference is overcome, it
becomes clear that domestic civil rights and international human rights standards largely
overlap.10 It is true that the United States conceived of and codified human rights before many

E/CN.4/1998/174 (Apr. 23, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Delegation Letter] (arguing in rejection of a critical report by a
United Nations Special Rapporteur that “the basic rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the ICCPR . . .
have long been protected as a matter of federal constitutional and statutory law” in the United States and further
asserting that the United States criminal justice system is among the “fairest in the world”); 146 Cong. Rec., S1276
(Mar. 8, 2000) (statement of Sen. Helms, Chairman, Sen. For. Rel. Comm.) (opposing ratification of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on the grounds that “the
United States has led the world in advancing opportunities for women”); Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 77
(1990) (explaining United States opposition to greater international human rights involvement as deriving from a
belief that “[h]uman rights in the United States . . . are alive and well.”); Paul L. Hoffman & Nadine Strossen,
Enforcing International Human Rights Law in the United States, in Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century
491 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove, eds.) (1994) (citing the widespread “attitude that U.S. civil rights
and civil liberties law is more protective of individual rights than the laws of any other country, so Americans do not
need these international protections”).
9
See Martha Minow, Lawyering at the Margins: Lawyering for Human Dignity, 11 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y &
L. 143, 165-66 (2003) (recalling a student’s comments that human rights and civil rights groups seem to have
nothing to do with one another and even appear to use different language and conceptions); Martha F. Davis,
International Human Rights and United States Law: Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 417, 417-18
(2000) (noting that civil rights lawyers in the United States have resisted framing their demands in international
human rights terms). The sharp divide in the use of the terms civil rights and human rights did not always exist.
References to civil rights protections made in times closer to the adoption of the United States Constitution as well
as in the latter half of the 19th century use the terminology of human rights. See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 119
(1866) (noting that “human rights” are secured by enforcement of the Constitution and the laws authorized by it); 2
J.Elliot’s Debates 446-448 (2d ed. 1876) (Patrick Henry advocating for adoption of the Bill of Rights as a means of
protecting “human rights”); 42nd Congress, 1st Sess., App. at 67 (the legislation that became Section 1983 was
referred to by its author as aiding in “the preservation of human liberty and human rights”); see generally, Jordan J.
Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy
in Domestic Courts, 10 Mich. J. Int’l L. 543 (1989).
10
See, e.g., Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 701, rep. note 8 (1987)
[hereinafter Restatement Third] (many provisions in the ICCPR parallel provisions in the United States
Constitution). The overlap between international and domestic standards is recognized broadly both by those who
press the United States to take on more direct and substantial international human rights obligations and by those
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other countries accepted that such rights existed and before the modern human rights movement
took form. The United States Constitution has provided an important model and guide for the
development of human rights standards in international law and in the domestic law of many
countries worldwide.11 As a result, international human rights standards do mirror the United
States Constitution in important respects.12 Stated conversely, the substantive civil rights found
in the United States Constitution, particularly in the original Bill of Rights and in the Fourteenth
Amendment, match many of the human rights protected in international law.
For example, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”13 Parallel language is found in Articles 9 and 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),14 which prohibits “arbitrary
arrest” and “arbitrary or unlawful interference with . . . privacy, family, home or
correspondence.” Articles IX, X and XXV of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man (“American Declaration”) also establish the rights to “inviolability” of the home and of
correspondence and the right to protection from “arbitrary arrest.”15

who urge that it is unnecessary or even unwise for the United States to do so. See, e.g., John M. Rogers,
International Human Rights Law and U.S. Law in World Justice: U.S. Courts and International Human Rights 107,
110, 118-19 (Mark Gibney, ed. 1991) [hereinafter World Justice] (arguing against direct application of international
human rights law in United States courts and asserting that the provisions of the United States Constitution largely
match international human rights standards); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1169, 1169
(1993) (noting the overlap between the terminology utilized in the United States Constitution and the ICCPR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights while criticizing the conditions imposed by the
United States on the ratification of the ICCPR).
11
See Henkin, supra note 8, at 1, 66, 126; Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 405,
415 (1979); Bassiouni, supra note 10, at 1169.
12
Henkin, supra note 8, at 126, 149 (“most of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
later of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are in their essence American constitutional rights
projected around the world”).
13
U.S. Const., amend. IV.
14
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9, 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. The ICCPR is binding on the United States. It was ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992 and
entered into force for the United States on September 8, 1992.
15
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, arts. IX, X and XXV, Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965) [hereinafter American Declaration]. The United States is considered to be bound
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The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
protect the right of the people “to be secure in their persons” and prohibit the deprivation of life
or liberty without due process of law and the infliction of “cruel and unusual” punishments.16
This language is matched by Article 9 of the ICCPR17 and Article I of the American
Declaration,18 both of which protect the right to liberty and security of the person. Article 7 of
the ICCPR also explicitly prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.19
Many other parallels are found between the language in the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and international standards. For
example, the First Amendment guarantees freedom of thought, religion, expression and
assembly.20 The ICCPR protects these same freedoms in Articles 18 through 2221 and the
American Declaration covers these freedoms in Articles III and IV and XXI and XXII.22
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides for “equal protection of the laws”23 while Article
26 of the ICCPR24 establishes the right to “equal protection of the law,” and Article II of the
American Declaration establishes the right to “equality before law.”25
Of course, there are a number of areas in which international human rights standards
arguably provide greater protections than the United States Constitution.26 International human
rights instruments also include treaties that cover broader social, economic and cultural rights not
by the provisions of the American Declaration, through its membership in the Organization of American States and
its obligations under the Charter of that inter-governmental body. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
16
U.S. Const., amends. IV, V, VIII.
17
ICCPR, art. 9.
18
American Declaration, art. I.
19
ICCPR, art. 7.
20
U.S. Const., amend. I.
21
ICCPR, arts. 18-22.
22
American Declaration, arts. III, IV, XXI, XXII.
23
U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
24
ICCPR, art. 26.
25
American Declaration, art. II.
26
See Restatement Third, supra note 10, § 701, rep. note 8 (1987); Henkin, supra note 8, at 150, 154.
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set forth in the United States Constitution.27 Still, the core human rights protected under
international law have counterparts in United States civil rights law.
B.

The United States’ Assertions that it Provides International Human Rights
Protections through its Domestic Human Rights System

It is therefore appropriate to assess the adequacy of the United States civil rights system
as a substitute for more active involvement by the United States in the international human rights
system. When studied closely, the argument of the United States is essentially that the civil
rights protections in the United States constitute an effective domestic human rights system.28
Thus, when the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992, the report of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations stated its position that U.S. civil rights protections were
sufficiently extensive such that ratification of the ICCPR did not entail or require acceptance of
any additional obligations.29 The Committee explicitly noted that implementing legislation was
not necessary given the general compatibility of domestic law with the ICCPR.30 Finally, the
Committee made its approval of ratification contingent on the inclusion of language making the
ICCPR non-self-executing.31 The terms of the ratification thus made clear that the obligations
accepted upon ratification of the ICCPR would be met only through existing United States law.
In subsequent reports to the United Nations regarding the ICCPR, the United States
emphasized its position that its human rights obligations were fulfilled through the functioning of
27

See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3;
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S. T.S. No. 69.
28
A number of scholars urge this point as well in defense of the failure of the United States to become more
involved in international human rights regimes. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and
International Human Rights Litigation, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2129, 2173 (1999); Rogers, supra note 10, at 107, 110,
118-19.
29
See U.S. Senate Executive Report, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 102-23, reproduced in 31 I.L.M. 645, 649 (1992)
[hereinafter Senate Comm. Report on the ICCPR].
30
Id. at 649.
31
Id. at 658. A treaty that is not self-executing does not have immediate direct applicability in domestic law but
rather requires legislation to incorporate its provisions into United States law. Restatement Third, supra note 10, §
111(3), comm. h.
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the United States domestic civil rights system. In 1994, the first report of the United States to the
Human Rights Committee, the United Nations body that supervises implementation of the
ICCPR,32 asserted that the United States Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, contains
protections of the “most important rights and freedoms.”33 In explaining the decision of the
United States to declare the provisions of the ICCPR non-self-executing, the report goes on to
say that the “fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant are already guaranteed
as a matter of U.S. law . . . and can be effectively asserted and enforced by individuals in the
judicial system on those bases.”34
In 1995, the United States echoed the same theme when its representatives appeared
before the Human Rights Committee. United States representatives from the Department of
State told the Human Rights Committee that no special or implementing legislation was needed
after ratification of the ICCPR, because the treaty “essentially embodied the individual rights and
freedoms enjoyed by Americans under their Constitution and Bill of Rights.”35 The
representatives went on to say that the non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR did not present
any problem, because “United States domestic law establishe[s] numerous mechanisms by which
the Covenant rights it guarantee[s] could be protected and asserted.”36
In 1998, several years after ratification of the ICCPR, the United States made similar
assertions before the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the political human rights body

32

See ICCPR, arts. 28-45.
Initial Report of the United States to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/81/Add.4, par. 8 (Aug. 24
1994) [hereinafter Initial ICCPR Report].
34
Id. at par. 8. (emphasis added).
35
U.N. H.R. Committee, Summary Record of the 1401st Meeting: United States of America, CCPR/C/SR.1401
(Apr. 17, 1995) (statement by State Department Legal Adviser Conrad Harper).
36
Id; see also U.N. H.R. Committee, Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting: United States of America,
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Mar. 31, 1995) (reflecting statement of Conrad Harper, State Department Legal Adviser, that the
ICCPR did not provide a direct cause of action in United States courts but that the rights in the ICCPR would be
guaranteed and effective recourse and remedies in case of violation made available, through the United States
domestic system).
33
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of the United Nations. In a heated response to the report of a United Nations Special Rapporteur
who visited the United States to analyze issues of police brutality and the application of the death
penalty, the official United States delegation to the Human Rights Commission stated that the
Rapporteur should devote most of his time to countries with “serious problems” rather than
reporting on the United States. In this context, the United States again noted that its domestic
law was so protective that it had not been necessary to adopt implementing legislation to give
effect to the ICCPR’s provisions in domestic law. The letter stated that, “the basic rights and
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the [ICCPR] have long been protected as a matter of
federal constitutional and statutory law.”37
Even more recently, in submissions made in 2006 to the United Nations Committee
Against Torture, which oversees implementation of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against
Torture”),38 the United States again emphasized the strength of domestic human rights
protections as a reason not to become further involved with the United Nations system for the
protection of human rights. The Committee Against Torture queried whether the United States
would consider allowing the Committee to receive and adjudicate complaints by individuals
claiming to have suffered human rights violations committed by the United States. The United
States responded negatively and stated:
[T]he United States legal system affords numerous opportunities for individuals to
complain of abuse, and to seek remedies for such alleged violations. Accordingly,
the United States will continue to direct its resources to addressing and dealing
with violations of the Convention pursuant to the operation of its own domestic
legal system.39
37

U.S. Delegation Letter, supra note 7.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The United States signed this treaty on April 18, 1988 and ratified on October 2, 1994.
39
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: United States of America,
CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, par. 163 (Jan. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Second Report to Committee Against Torture].
38
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The United States provided the same response when the Committee asked whether the United
States would consider ratification of an optional protocol to the Convention Against Torture that
would allow for liberal inspections of detention centers.40
C.

The Challenge to the United States’ Claim to an Effective Domestic Human
Rights System

This Article challenges the United States’ blithe assertions that it protects human rights
through its domestic civil rights system. The Article recognizes that the argument of the United
States has common-sense appeal and is also, in principle, a legitimate position to take pursuant to
international law. International human rights law condones protection of human rights through
domestic legal systems, including through application by the States’ judiciaries of constitutional
provisions in internal law that are comparable to international norms.41
However, this Article explains why United States civil right protections do not, in reality,
create an adequate system for the protection of human rights. It is not sufficient for the United
States to simply point to the similarity between the substantive rights codified internationally and
domestically. To assert that it provides effective human rights protections, the United States
must have a comprehensive structure and system for guaranteeing that the rights set forth
actually have meaning. A crucial component of such a system is a mechanism for responding to
human rights violations and providing redress, including compensation.

40

Response of the United States of America to the Committee Against Torture’s List of issues to be considered
during the examination of the second periodic report of the United States of America, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/AdvanceVersions/listUSA36_En.pdf [hereinafter Response to
Committee Against Torture].
41
See U.N. H.R. Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, par. 15, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 31] (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “does not require . . . incorporation . . . into
national law” and states may effectively assure the rights guaranteed in that treaty in a number of ways including
through “application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of law”); see also Henkin, supra note 8, at 17.
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The requirement of a mechanism for redress is central, because violations of human
rights do occur regardless of the substantive protections included in the United States
constitutional regime. Some notorious abuses come readily to mind. For example, after
September 11, 2001, law enforcement officials rounded up some 750 non-citizens and held many
without charge for extended periods of time. Many of these detainees were held at the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, where officers slammed them against
walls, twisted fingers and wrists, and rained racist language upon them.42
Other violations of individuals’ rights that do not reach the same level of notoriety occur
all too often. Police officers and prison officials use excessive force and engage in abuse and
even torture. They conduct unfounded and unlawful searches and seizures and coerce
confessions.43 And, corrections officials around the United States continue to sexually abuse
women in jails and prisons.44 The United States government has not denied that law
enforcement authorities in the United States sometimes violate the civil rights protections found
in the United States Constitution.45
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See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Supplemental Report on September 11
Detainees’ Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (Dec. 2003). Constitutional suits
based on these cases are currently working their way through the judicial system. Some claims have already been
dismissed on immunity and other grounds. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 (E.D.N.Y. June
14, 2006); cf. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
43
See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the
Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of America, CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006)
[hereinafter Committee Against Torture Conclusions] (expressing concern about reports of brutality and excessive
force by law enforcement personnel); U.N. H.R. Committee, Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties
under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations: United States of America, par. 30 (July 2006) (same).
44
See Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating International Human
Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law – A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 71 (2000); Response to Committee Against Torture, supra note 40 (recognizing that in 2004, eleven
allegations of sexual misconduct by Bureau of Prisons personnel were substantiated but that no compensation was
paid to any of the victims).
45
Second Report to Committee Against Torture, supra note 39, at pars. 89, 148; U.N. H.R. Committee, Third
Periodic reports of States Parties: United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/3, pars. 131, 174, 187 (Nov. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Third ICCPR Report].
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Unfortunately, the United States civil rights regime fails in the essential task of
addressing these violations and providing reparations to their victims. The sovereign immunity
rules preventing suit against governmental actors constitute a grave limitation on the ability of
victims to obtain redress for human rights violations.46 Those rules lay bare the
disingenuousness of the United States’ claim to vigilant domestic human rights protection.
In challenging the effectiveness of the United States system, this Article places special,
although not exclusive, emphasis on the rights to be free from unwarranted searches and
detention and from excessive police force, protected in the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. These are among those most easily understood
as human rights, and impunity in cases where they are violated creates obvious human rights
protection concerns. However, the civil rights protections found in the United States
Constitution and human rights under international law are both actually much broader. They
involve due process, equal protection and freedom of speech and association rights, for example,
which can come into play in reference to a wide range of governmental action. Just as with civil
rights law, international human rights law is invoked whenever the government violates rights
enumerated in the relevant law, and the rights protected are extensive.47 A remedy must be made
available whenever the government is responsible for a human rights violation.

46

Other significant limitations on the effectiveness of the United States system as a human rights protection regime
exist. For example, the insistence that the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply
extraterritorially, political question and foreign affairs doctrines as well as absolute immunities for certain categories
of actors and actions create problems for human rights protection by limiting the faculty of the courts to ensure
human rights accountability. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 105. This Article focuses only on sovereign immunity
limitations on suits for compensation, however.
47
International human rights law potentially categorizes a significantly greater range of harm suffered by
individuals as human rights violations in comparison to United States civil rights law, because international
human rights law makes a government responsible for omissions and failures to act where United States
law generally does not. See Int.-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29,
1988, par. 174; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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II.

How Sovereign Immunity Severely Restricts Redress for Civil Rights Violations
One of the most important, if not the most important, means of responding to civil rights

violations that take place is by providing compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the
violation. Other means of addressing civil rights violations, such as injunctions or declaratory
relief or even criminal proceedings against violators, serve important functions and may be
appropriate and even necessary responses to violations. However, they do not replace the crucial
role of compensation for harms suffered.
A.

The Importance of Compensation for Civil Rights Violations

The victim of a civil rights violation that cannot be fully undone can be made whole only
if compensation is available.48 It is also fundamentally unfair to require innocent victims of
wrongdoing at the hands of government officials, who are empowered by the public for the
public good, to bear the costs of the harm they suffer on their own rather than to spread those
costs among the population.49 By preventing such unfairness, a system that provides
compensation for violations serves the important purpose of affirming the vitality of the rule of
law and the legitimacy of the government and the courts.50 Monetary liability also provides an
important sanction and deterrent against further abusive acts and is sometimes the only
meaningful deterrent available.51
In the United States, the possibility of addressing civil rights violations through the
payment of compensation to victims is severely restricted. While a constitutional tort structure

48

See Amar, supra note 5, at 1427; Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1215.
See Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 23 (1983); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651, 654(1980) (“it is fairer to allocate . . . financial loss to the . . . costs of government
borne by all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose rights . . . have been violated”).
50
See Schuck, supra note 49, at 23; Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity and
Judicial Independence, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 521, 607-09 (2003).
51
Schuck, supra note 49, at 16 (noting that actions not likely to be repeated and decisions below the policy level can
often only be reached through tort liability); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1733
(1991); Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits against Public Officers, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1110 (1981).
49
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exists, allowing victims to seek government liability and payment of compensation through suit,
the United States legal system currently does not allow governmental liability and full
compensation for many constitutional violations. The doctrine of sovereign immunity severely
limits the ability of victims of civil rights/human rights abuses by the United States government
from seeking redress and accountability in the form of suits seeking compensation.
B.

The General Contours of Sovereign Immunity

The concept of sovereign immunity has a history in the United States as long as the
history of civil rights protections.52 The doctrine is not explicitly set forth in the United States
Constitution.53 Rather, it was transposed onto the United States system from English law, which
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution still assumed that “the King can do no wrong.”54
Sovereign immunity has always been closely tied to another British conception intended to limit
governmental liability—the rule making respondeat superior or enterprise responsibility,
applicable in tort actions involving private citizens, inapplicable to the government.55
In varying forms, sovereign immunity protects federal, state and local governments and
their components against suits by individuals for compensation alleging constitutional violations.
The doctrine also severely limits the extent to which individual agents of the federal, state or
local government may be sued for damages in civil rights cases. The exact contours of the
sovereign immunity protection have changed over time, but the doctrine still bars courts
completely from adjudicating a broad range of individual claims of unlawful conduct by
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The first explicit references to sovereign immunity came in the 1790s and 1800s. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286 (1846) (government cannot be sued
“except with its own consent.”); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 290 (1851) (no action can be sustained against the
government unless by its own consent).
53
See Jackson, supra note 50, at 523; Vazquez, supra note 5, at 859 n.1, 900.
54
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1201.
55
Schuck, supra note 49, at 29-39.
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governmental actors.56 Sovereign immunity is not a liability standard imposing a different or
higher burden of proof in cases against the government but instead is a bar to suit, which applies
to protect governmental entities without regard to the nature, merits or strength of the
constitutional claim at issue. The doctrine thus severely limits the possibility, even for victims of
established constitutional violations, to obtain redress for the harm they have suffered.
The remainder of this Section outlines the contours of sovereign immunity as it affects
civil rights claims. Only in reviewing the interaction of the various forms that the doctrine takes
can its broad blackout effect on litigation of constitutional violations be appreciated.
C.

Sovereign Immunity Protections for the Federal Government

The United States government is completely immune from suits for damages except
where it consents to be sued.57 The United States has not waived immunity from suit for
constitutional violations. As a result, a victim simply cannot sue the federal government for
damages directly under the United States Constitution.58
The United States did consent to certain limited types of suits when it passed the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) in 1946. The FTCA waives immunity for certain tort claims against
the United States. The FTCA relaxed the immunity of the United States to suits for damages
based on “run-of-the-mine” accidents and torts committed by the United States government and
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See Jackson, supra note 50, at 527 (2003).
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 704, 749 (1999) (“It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own
immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own courts.”); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 96 (1937) (“no
rule is better settled than that the United States cannot be sued except when Congress has so provided”).
58
The general immunity of the United States is so well established that few civil rights victims, other than the
occasional pro se litigant, attempt to bring claims against the federal government under the United States
Constitution. See Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n., 429 F.3d 1098, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing
constitutional claims against United States Parole Commission because it is “axiomatic” that the United States may
not be sued without consent). Almost no case law is available on this point other than the general assertions in cases
like Alden v. Maine, which reference federal government immunity as a principle that must be accepted without
explanation or citation. See 527 U.S. 704; Ickes, 300 U.S. 82.
57
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its officials.59 However, it did not open the door in a meaningful way to litigants seeking redress
for constitutional violations.
The FTCA allows suits against the federal government only “under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable” under the local law where the act or
omission occurred.60 In order to bring a suit under the FTCA, then, a victim of constitutional
rights must shoehorn the claimed violation into a common tort claim.61 This is not always
possible.62 The FTCA undesirably subjects determinations about compensation for violations of
federal constitutional rights to the vagaries of state tort law.
In essence, the FTCA serves, in certain circumscribed circumstances, to place the United
States in the same position as a private actor for purposes of tort liability. Of course, the
government is not simply a private actor but rather has unique power and authority. Yet, the
FTCA vehicle provides no room for asserting or recognizing the special harm caused when the
government violates rights set forth in the United States Constitution specifically to protect the
individual against abuse by an overbearing government.63
The FTCA includes additional limits that prevent it from providing a meaningful remedy
for victims of constitutional violations. The waiver of immunity contains numerous broad
exceptions. For example, claims based on intentional torts, such as assault and battery or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, are excluded from the coverage of the FTCA except
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See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953).
28 U.S.C. S 1346(b).
61
For example, an unlawful search and seizure might be brought as a trespass or false imprisonment claim and
would be required to meet the applicable standards under state tort law. The use of excessive force by a law
enforcement officer might be litigated as an assault claim.
62
See Schuck, supra note 49, at 114-15. For example, it is difficult to imagine which torts might be invoked in
cases involving unlawful surveillance or procedural due process.
63
See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability
under Bivens, 88 Geo. L.J. 65, 71-72 (1999) (quoting the opinion of Justice Brennan in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); Una A. Kim, Government Corruption and
the Right of Access to Courts, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 554 (2004).
60
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when committed by law enforcement officials.64 Thus, some serious constitutional violations
cannot be claimed against the United States through the FTCA.
The greatest limitation on the effectiveness of the FTCA as a means of redressing
constitutional violations is its discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign
immunity. That provision disallows claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.”65 This exception has been interpreted broadly to protect numerous
government activities.66 In theory, a constitutional violation should not fall within the
discretionary function exception, because federal officials do not possess discretion to violate
constitutional rights.67 In practice, the discretionary function exception operates much like
qualified immunity, discussed further below, to grant the benefit of the doubt to governmental
actors and to disallow actions against the government in many cases.68
Sovereign immunity thus prevents suits against the United States government for
violations of constitutional rights in all but a narrow category of cases that can be brought
effectively under the FTCA. Victims of civil rights violations by federal officials or agents often
cannot seek redress, in the form of compensation, by suing the federal government.
D.

Sovereign Immunity and Related Protections for State and Local
Governments

Victims of constitutional violations are not more successful with suits for damages
against state and local governments. The sovereign immunity doctrine grants states broad
64

28 U.S.C. S 2680(h).
28 U.S.C. S 2680(a).
66
See Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15.
67
See, e.g., Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2001).
68
See, e.g., Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2003) (FTCA suit barred because supervision of
convicted felon by federal parole officers is discretionary function); Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990)
(FTCA suit barred because decision to parole/release inmates is discretionary function); Pooler v. United States, 787
F.2d 868 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 849 (FTCA suit barred because conduct of criminal investigation,
even where unlawful arrest and prosecution are alleged, is discretionary function).
65
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immunity from claims by private individuals seeking damages in federal court for constitutional
violations. Localities enjoy a related form of protection.
1.

State Sovereign Immunity

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that sovereign immunity prevents individuals
from bringing constitutional claims against states in federal court.69 The only determination to
be made is whether the suit is against the state; if so, it must be dismissed on immunity grounds
even if the constitutional violation is established and egregious.70
2.

Protections for Local Government

Local government entities –such as counties, municipalities, districts—do not enjoy the
same blanket sovereign immunity applicable to states. To the extent that the ability to sue local
government in federal court provides a narrow window of liability for constitutional violations, it
is problematic that the ability of a victim to receive compensation for constitutional harm should
depend on the fact that a local rather than a state official committed the civil rights violation.71
In any case, victims of constitutional violations at the hands of local government also
face significant difficulties in obtaining compensation. The most important barrier to recovery
69

See Quern v. Jordan, 440 US 332 (1979) (deciding that Section 1983 does not override states’ sovereign immunity
and therefore disallowing constitutional actions against the state in federal court under Section 1983); see also
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 704. Statutory civil rights claims may be
brought against states in the discrete set of cases – for example housing and employment discrimination matters -where Congress has successfully abrogated the states’ immunity pursuant to the enforcement provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and provided a statutory cause of action. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (permitting abrogation of state immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631;Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
70
Given this rule, few victims of violations attempt to bring constitutional claims against the states. Occasionally,
the federal courts have the opportunity to reaffirm the sovereign immunity of states in cases where they determine
that a particular governmental actor, sued as a local entity, is instead properly characterized as a state actor. See,
e.g., Lawrence v. Chabot, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 12191 (6th Cir. May 16, 2006).
71
Many governmental actors that operate on the local level are nonetheless characterized as state government
entities entitled to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993) (social services
agency is state entity entitled to governmental sovereign immunity); Lewis v. Board of Educ., 262 F.Supp.2d 608
(D.Md. 2003) (school board is state entity entitled to governmental sovereign immunity). Even some law
enforcement entities – for example state troopers and state park police -- are properly designated as state actors. See
South Carolina Troopers Federation Local 13 v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
17064 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2004); Giancola v. West Virginia Dep't of Public Safety, 830 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1987).
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against local governments is the requirement of direct unconstitutional action by the government
itself. In Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., the Supreme Court ruled that local governments may
not be held responsible for constitutional violations on a respondeat superior theory as a result of
the unlawful actions of government employees, even though private employers are generally
subject to liability on that basis.72 Instead, victims of violations must show that the local
government itself had a policy that directly led to constitutional violations.
In practice, victims of constitutional violations by local government officials have an
extremely difficult time showing that those violations resulted from official government policy.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Carter v. Morris73 provides an example. The case involved
the arrest, based on a false identification, of Pamela Carter, who was then mistreated and
subjected to racial epithets while held by police officers from the Danville, Virginia police
department. Carter sued the City of Danville. The Fourth Circuit recognized that Monell
allowed local government responsibility for constitutional violations to be established, in the
absence of an official written policy, through evidence of a custom allowing its agents to commit
constitutional violations. However, to show such a custom, the court required proof of a
permanent widespread practice of abuse.74 The court refused to find a custom or policy and
impose liability despite Carter’s evidence of numerous prior incidents, spanning nearly two
decades, in which officers from the police department beat handcuffed suspects, engaged in other
shows of excessive force and then improperly handled complaints about those abuses. As is
demonstrated by this case, the preclusion of respondeat superior liability makes it so difficult to
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436 US 658, 691, 693 (1978). The Supreme Court has suggested that the unavailability of the respondeat superior
theory of liability in cases against local governments derives from sovereign immunity-like concerns about
federalism and separation of powers. See id. at 693, 701; see also Owen, 445 U.S. at 649, 655 n.39.
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164 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 1999).
74
Id. at 218 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 591).
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sue local governments that it results in “something close to effective immunity.”75
E.

Individual Government Officers and Qualified Immunity

The Supreme Court has suggested that the broad sovereign immunity provided to
governments is not problematic, because individual agents of the government can still be sued.76
Victims of constitutional violations may bring suit for damages against federal agents pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics77 and against state78
and local agents pursuant to Section 1983.79
The ability to sue an official does not compensate for the inability to sue the government
itself. Even if successful in court, a human rights victim may be unable to recover
compensation owed to her by an abusive official. Individual officials, without the financial
backing of the government, are not typically in a financial position to pay a damages award.80
In some instances, the government itself does ensure payment of a final damage award
against an employee, either directly or through a government-paid insurance regime, but this is
not always the case. The federal government has a general rule against paying judgments
assessed against its employees in Bivens actions.81 Also, where an individual government agent
is terminated from employment, sometimes as a result of the abuse committed, neither federal or
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Michael Rowan, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Using RICO as a Remedy for Police Misconduct, 31 Fla. St. U.L.
Rev. 231 (2003).
76
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 704.
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403 U.S. 388 (1971)
78
Because of the broad sovereign immunity available to states, actions against state officials are examined to
determine whether they are truly against the individual official or actually constitute disguised suits against the state.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974).
79
42 U.S.C. §1983.
80
See Schuck, supra note 49, at 98.
81
See United States Attorneys’ Manual § 4-5.412(F) (May 1998) (“a federal employee [is] personally responsible
for the satisfaction of a judgment entered solely against the employee; there is no right to compel indemnification
from the United States or any agency thereof”); 28 CFR §50.15 (Department of Justice employees may request
indemnification from the Department of Justice, and the Attorney General may determine that such indemnification
is proper if it “is in the interest of the United State”); see also Telephone Interview with Alexander Reinert (July 10,
2006). Reinert regularly litigates Bivens and Section 1983 claims and is currently litigating claims against the
federal government for the abuses committed against 9/11 detainees described above. See supra note 42.
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local governments will generally assume responsibility for a judgment against the agent.82 In
addition, the litigation insurance protection provided by some governments to its agents does not
cover acts of intentional or malicious misconduct.83 Thus, governments are least likely to ensure
that compensation is paid in those cases where their officials engage in the most serious human
rights abuses, resulting in their termination or exclusion from insurance/indemnification
coverage. The victims of the most egregious violations will therefore often go uncompensated.
In any case, many victims of civil rights violations will never obtain a favorable
judgment or even an opportunity to have their claims fully aired in court. Any government agent
or official sued under Bivens or Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity, which is a
powerful protection against suit.84
Qualified immunity is another layer of sovereign immunity, providing protection against
suit brought against government agents rather than the government itself. As the Supreme Court
has made clear, qualified immunity “springs from the same root considerations that generated the
doctrine of sovereign immunity” that bars suit against governments.85
Pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity, an official who violates the civil rights
protections found in the United States Constitution may nonetheless be immune from suit for
damages in court under Section 1983 or Bivens. The government official will be immune from
liability so long as the conduct in question was “objectively reasonable.”86 A government agent
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E-mail exchange with Victor Glasberg (July 28, 2006). Victor Glasberg, an attorney in Alexandria, Virginia,
regularly litigates Bivens and Section 1983 claims in federal court.
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85
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may be stripped of immunity and held responsible only if he knew or should have known that he
was violating a constitutional standard that was “clearly established at the time” of the action.87
As noted above, qualified immunity does not implicate a modification to substantive
liability standards in order to accommodate the unique circumstances of action by government
officials. The Supreme Court has held that there is no general constitutional liability standard
that must be met to establish official responsibility for constitutional violations under Section
1983 or Bivens. Rather, the standards applicable to a constitutional claim for damages, under
Section 1983 or Bivens, are determined by the relevant constitutional provisions and vary
depending on the constitutional right invoked.88 Qualified immunity does not change that
structure but instead applies as a bar to suit against officials even when they have violated the
relevant constitutional standard and would otherwise be liable for a constitutional violation.
The substantive standards that must be met to establish constitutional violations reflect
the special nature of government action, are stringent and often require highly intentional action
by government officials. For example, to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment for
failure to provide medical attention to a prisoner, the complainant must show that government
officials acted with "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury."89 To
establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment, a search or seizure must be “unreasonable” or
without “probable cause.”90 To make out a claim of excessive force under the substantive due
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Id. at 818-19. Pursuant to this standard, the central inquiry in most qualified immunity cases is whether the law
establishing a violation was clear at the time the action took place. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
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process protections of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, a plaintiff may be required to show
that law enforcement actions were “grossly disproportionate to the need for action” and “inspired
by malice.”91 Nonetheless, even where a constitutional violation can be made out based on these
stringent standards, qualified immunity wraps another “protective layer” around the conduct of
government officials and requires an additional analysis of reasonability.92
The Supreme Court has made this point even more clear by establishing that, when
litigation is filed against an individual officer, courts must first determine whether the allegations
raised would establish a constitutional violation if proven.93 Then, and only then, the court must
proceed to analyze whether the responsible official should enjoy immunity. By creating this
two-step process, the Supreme Court has left no doubt that the qualified immunity analysis is in
addition to the inquiry into constitutionality and bars suit even for constitutional violations if the
victim cannot also show that the abusive official knew or should have known that he was
violating a clearly established constitutional right.
The Supreme Court has also held that qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defence to liability.”94 If the officer is entitled to immunity, the suit should be
dismissed at a preliminary stage. Specifically, the Supreme Court requires that the determination
regarding qualified immunity and dismissal generally be made before discovery begins.95 The
Supreme Court has insisted that such an early dismissal is possible, because the applicability of
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qualified immunity is generally an objective and categorical determination not requiring a factspecific analysis.96 Thus, the victim of an unconstitutional action by a government official may
be deprived of the right even to have a court begin to uncover the merits of the claim.
The qualified immunity standard is interpreted in a manner that is highly protective of
government officials involved in constitutional wrongdoing and grants officials significant
deference.97 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the standard amply protects officials who
make “mistaken judgments” and violate the constitutional rights of victims. 98 The immunity
protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”99
Because of its broad reach, qualified immunity prevents redress for victims of a broad
range of constitutional violations committed by government officials.100 As one scholar has
noted, while qualified immunity may seem to have more modest effect than full sovereign
immunity, in reality it “has operated as a virtually complete bar to recovery.”101 Qualified
immunity has been identified as the main reason for the “remarkably low success rates” in
Bivens actions.102 Some estimate that, in 30 or more years of litigation under Bivens, tens of
thousands of federal employees have been subjected to suit but only about 100 of these suits
have resulted in final judgments providing relief in the form of damages to plaintiffs alleging
constitutional violations.103
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Wilson v. Layne, decided by the Supreme Court in 1999,104 demonstrates the difficulty of
overcoming the qualified immunity bar to suit in Bivens cases. That case involved the actions of
officials who brought members of the press into the home of a suspect’s parents when executing
an arrest warrant. The suspect was not present, but reporters photographed the father in
underpants and the mother in her nightgown. The suspect’s parents brought suit against the
involved officers, which proceeded as a Bivens claim.105 The Supreme Court unanimously held
that the officers’ action violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
However, the Court nonetheless held that the officers must be granted immunity pursuant to a
qualified immunity analysis and upheld dismissal of the suit against the officers.
Qualified immunity has similarly served as a substantial barrier to success on Section
1983 actions. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Robles v. Prince George’s County106 is a case in
point. In Robles, the victim brought suit under Section 1983 against police officers who tied
him to a metal pole in a deserted parking lot and abandoned him there after arresting him on a
traffic warrant at about 3:30 am. The court found that the officers’ behavior was unrelated to any
legitimate law enforcement purpose and held that their actions violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court affirmed the decision of the district court granting
summary judgment, though, on qualified immunity grounds. The court held that the officers
should have known that their “Keystone Kop” conduct was wrongful but did not have sufficient
notice from the case law that their conduct constituted a constitutional violation.107
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An empirical review demonstrates that more than half of those cases that reach the
Federal Circuit Courts to be decided on a qualified immunity defense result in a dismissal or
denial of relief on qualified immunity grounds. The author’s analysis of all cases, brought under
Bivens or Section 1983, in which the Circuit Courts of Appeals took up a qualified immunity
defense during the first six months of 2006, shows that the courts ruled on the qualified
immunity defense in 133 cases. The courts barred suit on qualified immunity grounds in 71 of
those 133 cases. The Courts of Appeals held, in another 12 cases, that qualified immunity
provided an alternative ground for their decision dismissing suit or denying relief.108
H.

The Inadequacy of State Court and State Law Alternatives to Federal Court
Adjudication of Constitutional Claims

The possibility of asserting constitutional claims against state and local governments and
officials in state courts does not provide an acceptable alternative to litigating claims under the
United States Constitution in federal court. The option of recurring to state courts thus does not
ameliorate the negative effect of the sovereign immunity doctrines applied by the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has made constitutional litigation against state governments in state
courts extremely unlikely. The Court has held that Section 1983 does not allow suit against
states even in their own courts. 109 The Court reached this conclusion as a matter of statutory
interpretation of the coverage of Section 1983, but that interpretation was explicitly informed by
sovereign immunity considerations.110 Constitutional claims may be brought against localities in
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state courts under Section 1983111 but are subject to the same Monell requirement of direct
unconstitutional action that has proved to be such a stringent limitation in federal court.
Individual officials are similarly entitled to the same problematic qualified immunity protections
described above.
The only remaining avenue -- litigation of federal constitutional grievances against state
and local governments and officials as state law claims -- is also an unacceptable alternative to
federal court litigation of claims under the United States Constitution. A number of state and
local government entities enjoy state-law sovereign immunity in their own courts that completely
precludes this alternative.112 In addition, as with FTCA claims, litigation of federal
constitutional violations as state law claims requires victims to frame their claims according to
the different state law standards applicable in each state and makes recovery for a federal
violation dependent on state law. Such litigation fails to recognize the unique nature of
constitutional claims and makes it very unlikely that appropriate compensation will be awarded.
An example of the inadequacy of state law claims as a substitute for federal constitutional
claims is provided by the case of Hill v. McKinley.113 Robin Hill suffered serious abuse when
she was jailed after an arrest for public intoxication. After they had forced her to undress, Hill’s
jailers decided to transfer her to a restraining board for “her security.” Although Hill weighed
only 110 pounds, six officers, including males, participated in the transfer of Hill down the hall
to a room containing the restraining board. The officers strapped Hill to the board face-down,
naked, and in a spread-eagle position. They kept her there for three hours.
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Hill brought constitutional claims against the officers under Section 1983 as the most
meaningful avenue for seeking redress given the difficulty of suing the government directly. The
Eighth Circuit found that the officers had violated Hill’s Fourth Amendment rights but
concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Fourth Amendment
did not clearly establish that Hill could not constitutionally be restrained naked.114 Hill was thus
denied any opportunity to bring a claim for damages under the United States Constitution.
Hill was left with a state law claim, which cabined her constitutional harm into the Iowa
tort of invasion of privacy. The state law privacy claim was successful at trial, and the Eighth
Circuit upheld the favorable verdict. Yet, Hill was awarded only $2,500 in damages.115
I.

The Effect of Sovereign Immunity Doctrines

The preceding description demonstrates how the layers of sovereign immunity interact to
preclude many suits for damages against governmental actors that commit constitutional
violations.116 Distilling these layers of sovereign immunity down to reveal which constitutional
claims for damages survive is a difficult task. In summary, though, no suit for compensation
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alleging violations under the United States Constitution may proceed against the states of the
United States. Nor can any such suit be pursued against the federal government unless the
constitutional harms can effectively be brought under the FTCA as tort claims recognized under
state law and also be framed to avoid the broad exceptions to government liability under the
FTCA, including the discretionary function exception. Claims for compensation may be brought
against local governments but face the difficult hurdle of establishing direct government
responsibility for constitutional violations under Monell. Constitutional claims may be brought
against individual federal, state or local government officials, who may not have the resources to
pay those claims even if successful, but qualified immunity leads to dismissal, often early in the
litigation, of an important number of those claims.
As one scholar has noted, “the promise of monetary compensation for constitutional
violations has not been fulfilled.”117 The result is that “many victims of constitutional violations
get nothing, and many others get redress that is less than complete.”118 The system leaves
victims of recognized constitutional violations without an opportunity to obtain compensation for
the harm they have suffered, leaving a serious right-remedy gap that is even acknowledged, to
some degree, by the United States government.119
III.

The Failure of the United States Civil Rights System to Measure Up as an Effective
Human Rights System under International Law
There can be little doubt that, given the limitations imposed by sovereign immunity, the
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Section lays out the reasons why the United States civil rights regime is inadequate for the
protection of human rights under international human rights law standards.
It is appropriate to turn to international law to gauge the adequacy of the United States
system. To assess the claim that the United States has an effective domestic human rights
system, it must be possible to judge the system by some standard. It would be circular to analyze
the system as to its adequacy under the United States Constitution and interpretations of that
document. The question here is whether the United States constitutional system adequately steps
in to protect human rights as effectively as would the international human rights system. And,
after all, the United States has invoked its domestic civil rights system as a defense against
further international involvement. It only makes sense, then, to judge the United States system
by international human rights standards to determine whether the system, in fact, provides an
adequate substitute for greater international commitments or whether international human rights
law would require more or different protections.
In invoking international human rights standards, this Article does not suggest that these
norms are directly applicable in the United States. Nor does the Article urge a determination by
international bodies that the United States is in violation of international law.120 Such direct
applicability and oversight of international human rights compliance is exactly what the United
States has refused to accept. Instead, this Article challenges the rationale offered by the United
States to explain the limitations that it has placed on its involvement with international human
rights. International human rights law is utilized to identify what is required of an effective
human rights system and to measure the United States system against those requirements.
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A.

Structural Incompatibility of the United States System with International
Human Rights Protection

The doctrine of sovereign immunity places governmental actors in a privileged position
vis-à-vis the people of the United States. Whereas individuals can sue private actors and obtain
compensation for a wide range of conduct,121 as described above, individuals are greatly
restricted in their ability to sue the government and its officials for compensation.
This structure, which provides special protections for government actions even where
they violate civil/human rights, is diametrically opposed to the central purpose and rationale of
human rights protection pursuant to international law. The primary purpose of international
human rights law is “the safeguard of the individual in the face of the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of the State.”122
International human rights law recognizes that the State and its agents are in the strongest
position to protect human rights or to harm them. The citizens cede great power to the State, and
the State is expected to use that power to protect the citizenry.123 When the State instead abuses
the rights of its citizens, it can cause great harm because of its strength. It also breaches the trust
that the citizens place in it to provide proper protection. International human rights law
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acknowledges that violations of rights committed by the State are qualitatively worse than harms
caused by private individuals.124
International human rights law thus imposes the greatest, not the least, burdens of human
rights protection on the State. It focuses on the responsibility of States in relation to human
rights rather than on private entities or individuals and generally provides a means of redress
only for victims of the actions and omissions of States.125 Private actors may do damage to the
rights of others, but they will generally not be liable for human rights violations.126
Through its adherence to sovereign immunity protections for governmental actors, the
United States system turns human rights protection on its head. The United States system
protects the government against the citizenry rather than the reverse.
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B.

The Failure of the United States to Meet its obligation under International
Human Rights Law to Provide Reparations/Compensation

International human rights law firmly establishes the right to an effective remedy for
human rights violations, including pecuniary compensation for the victim. The right to a
remedy, including compensation, is a necessary corollary to the human rights obligations
imposed on the State.
1.

The International Human Rights Law Requirement of Compensation

Almost all international human rights declarations and treaties, including those that are
binding on the United States, impose an obligation on the State to provide compensation for
violations of rights that do occur.127 This obligation is found in specific articles of the
international instruments that provide for a right to an effective remedy as well as in the general
obligation imposed on States by international norms to “respect” and to “ensure” human rights.
The ICCPR, which is binding on the United States, provides in its Article 2, paragraph 3,
that States Parties to the treaty must “ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy.” 128 The United Nations Human Rights
Committee, in overseeing and interpreting the ICCPR, has established that an effective remedy
includes compensation. In its General Comment analyzing the legal obligations imposed by the
ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee specified that the provision requiring an effective remedy
can only be fulfilled if “appropriate compensation” is made available to victims of human rights
violations.129 In its General Comment addressing torture, the Human Rights Committee stated

127

Restatement Third, supra note 10, at § 703, comm. c (noting that international human rights agreements generally
require a state party to provide remedies internally for violations of human rights and that a failure to provide such
remedies constitutes an additional human rights violation).
128
No reservation or declaration made by the United States upon ratification of the ICCPR affects the application of
Article 2 other than the general declaration that the provisions of the ICCPR are not self-executing, which is
irrelevant to this analysis.
129
See General Comment No. 31, supra note 41, at par. 16.

37

unequivocally that, “States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy,
including compensation.”130
The Human Rights Committee has specifically emphasized the requirement of
compensation in its interactions with the United States. After reviewing the United States’ first
report to the Human Rights Committee, that body urged the United States to ensure that “victims
be compensated” in cases of excessive use of force by the police.131
The Convention Against Torture, also binding on the United States, provides explicitly
for the obligation to provide compensation in its Article 14.132 That provision establishes that
the victim of an act of torture, or the family of that victim if death results, should be guaranteed
the “right to fair and adequate compensation.” The Committee against Torture has also
emphasized this right to compensation in its dealings with the United States. In the conclusions
and recommendations that it issued to the United States in 2006, the Committee against Torture
expressed concern that some victims of abuses by United States government officials have faced
difficulties obtaining redress and adequate compensation. The Committee then specifically
urged the United States to ensure that “mechanisms to obtain full redress, compensation and
rehabilitation are accessible to all victims of . . . abuse . . . perpetrated by its officials.”133
The American Convention on Human Rights (the “American Convention”), which is the
regional treaty governing human rights in the Americas, also establishes in its Article 25 the right
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of individuals to judicial protection and a remedy for human rights violations.134 In addition,
Article 1 of the American Convention requires States Parties to “ensure” to all persons the free
and full exercise of the rights and freedoms protected therein.135 While the United States has not
ratified this treaty, it nonetheless provides important guidance regarding the international human
rights law standards that have been adopted and accepted by the States of the Americas.136 The
treaty and its interpretations have additional persuasive weight, because the United States is
considered to be bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, through
its membership in the Organization of American States and its obligations under the Charter of
that inter-governmental body.137 The American Convention builds upon and develops the
standards found in the American Declaration.138
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the “Inter-American Court”), which serves
as the final authoritative body interpreting the American Declaration and the American
Convention, has emphatically established the duty of States to provide compensation to human
rights victims. The Inter-American Court first expounded upon the obligation to provide
compensation for human rights violations in 1988 in its seminal decision in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case.139 The case was brought against the government of Honduras alleging charging
members of the Honduran military and intelligence services had abducted Manfredo Velasquez
Rodriguez, a university student. The security forces took Velasquez in an unmarked car,
134
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constituting an arrest without warrant, held him and interrogated and tortured him. Because the
police and security forces refused to acknowledge his arrest and detention, the Inter-American
Court considered that Velasquez had been “disappeared.” After finding a number of violations
of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court noted that Article 25 of
the Convention requires an effective remedy where human rights are violated. The Court
expounded on the type of remedy required when it analyzed the State’s duty under Article 1 of
the Convention to “ensure” the rights and freedoms delineated in the treaty. The Court held that,
in addition to the obligation to investigate violations that take place and to sanction those
responsible, States must provide compensation “for damages resulting from the violation.”140
Since that time, the Inter-American Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the obligation of States to
provide reparations, including monetary compensation, for human rights violations.141
2.

The Incompatibility with International Human Rights Law
of Limitations on Compensation in the United States

Because of the application of sovereign immunity described above, the United States
civil rights system fails to meet the central human rights protection obligation of providing
compensation when violations occur. International human rights law does not impose specific
requirements regarding the manner in which compensation be provided. However, it does
require that victims of human rights violations be provided with a meaningful route for obtaining
redress.142 The United States has not provided such a mechanism. As discussed above, the
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United States system precludes suit against the government, and suits against individual officials
do not reliably result in compensation, because officers are often unable to pay if a judgment is
rendered against them and because qualified immunity frequently protects them from such a
judgment in the first place.
The Inter-American Court and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
entity responsible for interpreting the American Declaration and American Convention in the
first instance and for applying the American Declaration in cases against the United States, have
both made clear that the State does not comply with its responsibility to provide compensation
where it leaves payment to victims in the hands of individual officials who may not have the
ability to pay a judgment. In the case of the Gomez Paquiyauri Brothers, 143 involving the
kidnapping and killing by the Peruvian government of two young brothers unjustly accused of
involvement in guerrilla activities, the courts of Peru entered a judgment against several lowlevel Peruvian government officials ordering the payment of compensation. The family was
nonetheless unable to recover any monies. In its submissions to the Inter-American Court, the
Inter-American Commission took the position that Peru had failed in its obligation to provide
compensation, because it had ordered the payment of compensation by officials without
resources and had not taken actions to ensure that payment was made.144 The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights agreed that the provisions of domestic law must be structured in such a
way as to ensure that compensation would actually be paid.145
Nor does international human rights law permit a rule under which compensation will be
forthcoming only in those limited cases where qualified immunity protections for government
officials, like those established in United States law, are overcome. Put in other terms, the
143
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international human rights law requirement of compensation does not apply only in those cases
where a government official commits a human rights violation and also acts in a manner that is
objectively unreasonable in doing so.
As with civil rights law in the United States, international human rights law does not
preclude any consideration of reasonableness. The substantive requirements of international
human rights law must be met before it can be said that a violation has taken place, and many of
the provisions of human rights law include significant flexibility. Thus, for example, a detention
or search must be “arbitrary” before it constitutes a violation of human rights protected in the
ICCPR. Use of force does not lead to a human rights violation under the ICCPR unless it rises to
the level of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. Almost all of the international
human rights instruments also allow derogations of certain rights under specific public
emergency conditions.146 However, once government actors commit a violation, as determined
under the relevant standards, the right to redress, including compensation, attaches immediately.
In the United States, qualified immunity permits recovery for rights violations against
individual officials only where an additional showing of individual culpability or fault in relation
to the lawfulness of the action leading to a human rights violation can be made.147 It essentially
requires a victim to establish that the official in question knew or should have known that he was
engaged in a violation of human rights.
Human rights law, on the other hand, considers all violations of the substantive human
rights norms, which are attributable to State actors operating within the scope of their
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employment, to result in a requirement of redress, including compensation.148 No consideration
is given to the individual culpability of the actor committing the violation.149
The requirement of specific culpability under the qualified immunity standard in the
United States is a by-product of the immunity rules that force suits to be directed against
individual officials rather than against the government.150 But, the ultimate obligation under
international human rights law to provide redress for violations committed by governmental
actors remains at all times with the State.151 The United States may not avoid its responsibility
as a State to ensure that compensation is paid for human rights violations by requiring victims to
proceed against individual officials and then protecting those officials with qualified immunity.
The United States has argued that various domestic means of enforcing rights, other than
through individual suits for compensation, provide an adequate remedy for human rights
violations. Specifically, the United States has identified criminal proceedings against violators,
pattern and practice suits brought by the federal government and habeas corpus petitions as
avenues providing adequate enforcement of human rights.152 None of these other mechanisms
allows human rights victims to initiate proceedings that have the possibility of resulting in
redress in the form of the compensation. Because international human rights law makes an
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award of compensation indispensable, U.S. human rights obligations cannot be satisfied
exclusively by any of these other remedies.
The United States may have the authority, and even the duty, to employ methods of
human rights protection other than compensation. Compensation alone may not be adequate in
some cases. For example, international human rights law generally requires States to pursue
sanctions against those committing serious human rights violations.153
However, even where the provision of compensation is not the only response to human
rights violations that is required, it is nonetheless a required response. Other means of
enforcement cannot replace its crucial role under international human rights law.154
C.

The Impermissibility under International Human Rights Law
of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrines Applied in the United States

In addition to its general requirement of compensation, international human rights law
specifically prohibits immunities of the type granted to governmental actors in the United States.
Almost every major human rights body has issued interpretations establishing the incompatibility
of immunities with international human rights law.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has found that immunity provisions are
incompatible with the ICCPR. In its General Comments interpreting the obligations of States
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under the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has held that States do not respect their ICCPR
obligations when they apply “amnesties,” “immunities and indemnities.”155 The Human Rights
Committee’s conclusions are based, in part, on the requirement that States must provide
compensation for violations and must not “deprive individuals of the right to an effective
remedy.”156 The Human Rights Committee has also specifically noted that official status cannot
justify immunity from legal responsibility.157 In another pronouncement, the Human Rights
Committee specifically stated that a grant of immunity to officials is incompatible with Article 2
of the ICCPR, which enshrines the right to an effective remedy.158
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has similarly held that immunity provisions
are incompatible with the American Convention. In its decision in the Barrios Altos Case, the
Inter-American Court had occasion to address amnesty provisions adopted by the Peruvian
government to protect government officials from all legal responsibility for human rights
violations. The Court held that the provisions were impermissible under the Convention,
because they obstructed access to justice and prevented human rights victims from “knowing the
truth and receiving the corresponding reparation.”159
Both the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court have thus far addressed
the question of immunities largely in the context of amnesties from criminal prosecution.
However, nothing in their pronouncements suggests that immunities from suit for compensation
would be any less problematic under international human rights law. In fact, their interpretations
highlight the impact that any immunity provisions have on the right to an effective remedy and
the right to reparations. The central concern of these bodies is that the application of immunities
155
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makes it impossible for States to comply with their obligations in responding to human rights
violations that occur, including the obligation to provide compensation.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights did have an opportunity to address
provisions explicitly providing immunity from civil suit for governmental actors. In its 1994
report on the human rights situation in El Salvador, the Inter-American Commission analyzed the
amnesty law adopted in El Salvador in 1993.160 That amnesty extinguished all civil liability for
individuals who committed acts of violence during El Salvador’s civil war, including those
identified as having committed human rights violations by the report of the United Nations Truth
Commission for El Salvador. The Inter-American Commission expressed special concern that
the amnesty precluded civil liability and therefore directly affected the rights of human rights
victims. The Commission concluded that the amnesty violated the American Convention,
because it precluded criminal prosecution of actors involved in serious human rights violations
but also because it “eliminate[d] any possibility of obtaining adequate pecuniary compensation . .
. for victims.”161
The European Court of Human Rights (the “European Court”), interpreting the European
Convention on Human Rights (“European Convention”), has had greater occasion to analyze in
depth the issue of immunities in the context of civil litigation for compensation. That Court has
determined that the grant to governmental actors of immunities from suit necessarily leads to a
breach of the obligations of the State under international human rights law. The European
Convention is obviously not binding on the United States. However, the decisions of the
European Court provide useful guidance in understanding the contours of the general right to
compensation for violations under international human rights law and the permissibility of
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limitations on that right imposed through immunities. The interpretations of the European Court
are particularly helpful, because the European Convention establishes the right to access a court
to seek redress for violations of human rights and the right to obtain a remedy in terms similar to
those included in the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture and the American Declaration.162
For more than a decade now, the European Court has alerted the countries of Europe that
immunities violate the terms of the European Convention. As early as 1994, the European Court
held that it would be inconsistent with “the rule of law in a democratic society” if a State could
“remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunities
from civil liability on large groups or categories of persons.163
In 1998, in the case of Osman v. United Kingdom, the European Court issued a decision
that left little room for doubt on the illegitimacy of immunities under the international human
rights law norms included in the European Convention. The decision addressed standards
applied by the United Kingdom in civil suits against the police, which, in the view of the
European Court, provided “immunity on the police” for acts and omissions related to their lawenforcement activities.164
The case involved allegations that the police had failed to protect the Osman family from
a gunman. The police had been advised that the gunman was hostile toward one member of the
family. However, the police did not prevent the gunman from attacking the family in a shooting
that resulted in the death of one member of the family and serious injury to another. The family
brought a negligence suit against the police in the British courts. The British appellate court
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dismissed the Osman family’s suit against the police on the grounds that public policy precluded
an action against the police in negligence in the investigation and suppression of crime.
The European Court then analyzed the dismissal by the British courts of the case against
the police as one of denial of access to a court under Article 6 of the European Convention. The
European Court held that the immunity provided to the police in the domestic proceedings
amounted “to an unjustifiable restriction on an applicant’s right to have a determination on the
merits of his or her claim against the police.”165 The European Court held that the British courts
were required to examine the claims made against the police on the merits in an adversarial
proceeding that would require the police to “account for their actions and omissions,” rather than
to dismiss those claims on immunity grounds.166
The Osman case established the impermissibility under European human rights law of
immunities that allow for categorical dismissals of suits against the government through the
application of objective or bright-line tests rather than requiring litigation of the individual facts
of each case and an analysis of the specific acts or omissions in question. The sovereign
immunities applicable in the United States, which prohibit altogether suits against the
government and which require dismissal of suits against individual officers whenever the
objective determination is made that their actions did not violate “clearly established” law, would
clearly not pass the European test.
In the subsequent 2001 case of Z v. United Kingdom, the European Court changed its
interpretation of British law but did not alter in any way its holding that immunities are
incompatible with the European Convention.167 In Z, the Court made clear that formal
immunities, in the form of procedural bars applied in specified categories of cases, as well as
165
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overly restrictive interpretations of substantive law resulting in a denial of relief to victims of
human rights violations both violate international human rights law.
Z involved a claim that local authorities in the United Kingdom had failed to take
adequate measures to protect four children who were severely abused and neglected by their
parents. Suit was filed on the children’s behalf against the local authority, claiming damages for
negligence and failure to comply with a statutory duty. The British courts dismissed the claim,
and that dismissal was appealed and eventually affirmed by the British House of Lords.
In analyzing the case, the European Court held that the United Kingdom, by omission,
had violated Article 3 of the European Convention, which protects the right to be free from
inhuman or degrading treatment.168 The Court then analyzed the claim that the United Kingdom
had denied access to the courts and a remedy to the victims through the grant of an
impermissible immunity to the local government.
The European Court held that the decisions of the British courts dismissing the children’s
claim could not be “characterized as either an exclusionary rule or an immunity.”169 The
European Court found instead that the British courts had analyzed the law of negligence actions
and determined that British law did not allow for establishment of a duty of care – a required
element for a negligence action —in this context of administering a welfare program. The
European Court concluded that the inability of the children to sue the local authorities “flowed
not from an immunity but from the applicable principles governing the substantive rights of
action in domestic law.”170 As a result, in dismissing the children’s action, the United Kingdom
did not violate Article 6 of the European Convention guaranteeing access to the courts.
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However, the European Court concluded, the United Kingdom was responsible for a
violation of Article 13, guaranteeing a remedy for rights violations, because the domestic court
system had not provided a remedy for the violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In reaching
this conclusion, the European Court emphasized the importance of the State’s obligation to
provide a remedy for human rights violations, including compensation for damages at a
minimum.171 The European Court found that any impediment – in this case the substantive
limits on negligence actions -- preventing the possibility to seek and obtain “an enforceable
award of compensation” violated the European Convention’s requirements. The European Court
therefore ordered Great Britain to pay damages for the violations of Articles 3 and 13 of the
European Convention.172
The change in the European Court’s characterization of the bases for dismissal of
negligence actions in the United Kingdom appears to be justified. It seems to reflect a new
understanding of British negligence law available to the European Court for the first time in Z
rather than an acceptance of a British tactic to avoid international liability by labeling immunity
as substance or a dilution of the court’s standards regarding immunities. In Z, the lawyers for the
United Kingdom made a particular effort, based on the scholarly work that had been conducted
internally in Britain after Osman, to better explain British standards for dismissing negligence
claims.173 In addition, the law in the United Kingdom changed modestly after Osman and before
Z. British legal standards incorporated greater individualized determinations in negligence cases
in order to move further away from any appearance of immunity.174
171
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The European Court’s interpretation of the dismissal in the Z case as constituting an
application of substantive law also seems correct. The case involved claims that, due to
government negligence, the victims suffered harm at the hands of non-governmental third
parties. It is not altogether surprising that such a claim would be dismissed by the British courts
as a question of substantive law without the necessity of applying immunity. In fact, the case is
strikingly similar to a case in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed dismissal on
substantive rather than sovereign immunity grounds. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Social Services, the Supreme Court analyzed a claim brought under Section 1983 alleging that
a local governmental social services agency had engaged in a substantive due process
constitutional violation by failing to prevent serious physical abuse of a young boy by the boy’s
father.175 The Supreme Court held that “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private
violence” did not constitute a constitutional violation.176 Given its decision on the merits of the
substantive constitutional claim, the Supreme Court expressly declined to consider whether an
immunity defense might be available.177
Nowhere in Z does the European Court qualify its holding in Osman that categorical
immunities, which bar human rights claims, are impermissible. In fact, the European Court
references the rule against immunities while deciding that the case before it does not present an
immunity question.178 The European Court’s decision in Z must therefore be seen as a
reaffirmation that immunities impermissibly restrict the ability of victims of human rights
violations to obtain redress and simultaneously as a warning that limitations on substantive
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domestic law may also lead to breaches of State human rights obligations, although the two
situations may be addressed under different provisions of the European Convention.
The United States’ civil rights regime is fatally flawed under the international human
rights law standards that prohibit immunities for government abuses. There can be no argument
that the United States immunity system is really just a system for eliminating claims on
substantive grounds and thus resembles the system at issue in the Z case. The sovereign
immunity name given the doctrine in the United States is too apt. As described above, the
doctrine provides immunity even in those cases where substantive law leads to a finding of a
constitutional violation.
IV.

The International Trend Away from Sovereign Immunity
While the United States clings to sovereign immunity, much of the rest of the world is

abandoning any vestiges of sovereign immunity doctrines still found in their legal systems.
There is no indication that other States have suffered serious negative consequences by foregoing
sovereign immunity, and there is every reason to believe that the move away from sovereign
immunity has improved the ability of these States to protect human rights.
Comparative studies of governmental liability regimes have identified the trend toward
the abolition of sovereign immunity. Fifteen years ago, a study published by the United
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law and the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law found that, through a combination of developments, legal systems had
“gradually but dramatically” altered their prior position of insistence on sovereign immunity.179
The study noted that none of the legal systems included therein, including England and Wales,
Scotland, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany and the European
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Community, continued to apply a full-fledged sovereign immunity doctrine.180 The authors of
the study concluded even more broadly that the general picture, which emerged from their
comparative analysis, was one of a “widening of governmental liability.”181 They found that
immunities were declining and the grounds for obtaining compensation were expanding.182
More recently, authors in the United States have also noted the trend in Europe toward setting
aside rules of sovereign immunity and allowing for greater government liability.183
The reasons and methods for the changes in domestic law that eliminate or severely
restrict sovereign immunity vary from country to country. Some countries have determined that
sovereign immunity no longer fits well with the overarching structure of their legal system and
have made changes through legislation or constitutional changes.184 In other countries, changes
have been motivated by newer interpretations of existing constitutional schemes and have been
wrought by the judiciary.185 Supra-national structures and laws, including human rights as well
as other treaties establishing additional individual rights, have also motivated the movement
away from immunity in some domestic legal systems.186
The remainder of this Section describes briefly the manner in which the legal systems of
the United Kingdom, France and Argentina provide human rights protections by allowing suits
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for compensation against the government without the barrier of sovereign immunity.187 The
legal systems in these three States handle human rights claims largely through regular noncontractual (common tort or tort-like civil liability) schemes.188 In each country, these schemes
have explicitly developed as human rights protection systems,189 where constitutional and other
rights claims can be heard, without the application of sovereign immunity.190
A comparison of these other systems with the civil rights regime in the United States is
instructive. The experience in these three countries suggests that the United States could choose
a path away from sovereign immunity without harm to its legal system. In doing so, the United
States would bring its protections for human rights more closely into line with international
standards, would close a widening gap between it and other countries boasting well-developed
legal systems and would vindicate the United States’ own constitutionally-guaranteed rights.
A.

England

The development of the law in England, resulting in the abolition of sovereign immunity
more than fifty years ago, is illuminating, since the sovereign immunity doctrines applicable in
the United States originally derived from British law. The last remnants of sovereign immunity
available in the United Kingdom in relation to suits for damages against the government were
187
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eliminated in 1947 with the passage of the Crown Proceedings Act. That legislation made the
central government (the “Crown”) liable to suit.191 Local governments had already been
liable.192 With the abolition of sovereign immunity at all levels came the applicability of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus, under English law, governmental entities are vicariously
liable to third parties where an employee official acts unlawfully in the course of his or her
employment.193 The effect is that governmental institutions and their employee officials are
jointly liable for wrongful acts, and suits for compensation can be brought against either with the
government paying any damages awarded in either case.194 Recovery of compensation from
governmental actors for human rights abuses is now available in a wide range of cases in the
United Kingdom.195
Victims of abuses generally bring actions against governmental actors in the form of tort
claims, and substantive tort law in England has persisted in considering certain special factors
that may limit liability of governmental actors. Thus, a public official may in some limited
circumstances avoid responsibility by alleging that he/she acted in good faith or acted within a
statutory authorization.196
However, these substantive law protections for government should not be considered a de
facto revival of sovereign immunity that defeats human rights protections. As described above,
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as a result of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the Osman and Z cases,
the British courts have more carefully delineated and delimited the special considerations granted
to the government.197 These special considerations are therefore on the decline.
In any case, the substantive law limitations on suit have been almost completely limited
to the context of negligence tort claims alleging governmental failures to protect against harm by
third party non-governmental actors.198 These cases have received much attention, in part
because of their treatment by the European Court of Human Rights, but they do not accurately
portray the extent to which government liability is available in most cases. Cases alleging
intentional and affirmative governmental wrongdoing are regularly allowed.199 Actions against
the police for assault or false imprisonment are common for example.200
For example, in 2003, a British court awarded almost $500,000 in damages to a black
delivery driver, who was detained when he made a delivery to a company that was in the process
of being searched by police and was then subjected to racial epithets and brought up on false
charges.201 In 2005, the British House of Lords reaffirmed the ability of individuals eventually
acquitted after criminal proceedings to bring claims against the police for malicious prosecution
and misfeasance in public office. In the case of O’Brien v. Chief Constable of Wales, O’Brien
claimed that his conviction and imprisonment for 11 years was the result of an improper
investigation conducted by police officials. The British courts not only allowed the claim to
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proceed but allowed O’Brien to present evidence suggesting misconduct in earlier investigations
conducted by the same officers in support of his claim.202
In addition, the United Kingdom has now enacted legislation, the Human Rights Act of
1998, which allows victims to sue governmental authorities for violations of the rights protected
in the European Convention.203 Because this Act bases its substantive law on the terms of the
European Convention, the British courts may not apply, in cases brought under this legislation,
substantive law restrictions on governmental responsibility not considered in the human rights
treaty. The enactment of the Human Rights Act also dispels any lingering doubts about the
adequacy of using the tort system alone for addressing governmental human rights abuses in the
United Kingdom. Victims may base their claims directly on specific human rights violations.
Victims are now regularly bringing claims both under the Human Rights Act and on a tort theory
with significant success.204
B.

France

As with England, France has eliminated any lingering traces of sovereign immunity. The
elimination of immunity in France provides a useful perspective, because substantive liability in
France is expansive.205 Despite this broad exposure of the government to liability, France has
not deemed it necessary to provide protection from suit through sovereign immunity.
In France, local public bodies enjoy no immunity and can be sued for damages.206 The
central government (or national government) has also lost any immunity from suits for
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compensation it once claimed except in a narrow category of cases involving “acts of state” in
the conduct of foreign affairs.207
Victims of governmental abuses may then bring a range of claims against governmental
actors in France.208 The government accepts respondeat superior liability and pays for claims
involving actions or omissions by its employees in the course of employment from public
funds.209 While the majority of claims against the government are heard in administrative courts,
cases involving claims against public authorities that would constitute serious human rights
abuses are handled by regular courts.210 The French legal system deems these cases too
consequential to be heard in administrative tribunals and thus places them under the jurisdiction
of courts with higher status in the legal hierarchy.211 Actions heard exclusively in regular court
include those claims against public authorities arising from interference with personal liberty,
including arbitrary arrest, unlawful use of force and invasion of the privacy of the home.
French law generally requires a claim for damages to be based on a showing of
wrongdoing or “illegality.”212 However, French courts do not engage in any additional “public
law immunity” analysis considering whether the officials in questions were involved in
discretionary functions or otherwise entitled to protection due to their status as public officials.213
In fact, in some cases, the French courts will award compensation to individuals who
have suffered harm at the hands of the government even if no government official or entity is at
207
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fault at all, even through negligence.214 The French system considers that, where the government
engages in conduct that creates a risk of injury and harm takes place, the public as a whole
should pay the cost. The rationale is that no individual should bear the burden of harm caused
when the government acts to the benefit of society as a whole.215 As an example, French law
will award damages to an individual harmed when the police use weapons issued by the State in
an operation to maintain public order, without any regard to the fault of the officers involved.216
The French liability regime explicitly recognizes the special and extensive powers given
to the government and imposes corresponding special duties on governmental actors not
applicable to individuals.217 The result is broad liability without immunity.
C.

Argentina

The legal system in Argentina provides a particularly interesting point of comparison for
the United States system. Argentina’s relevance as a country within the Americas with a welldeveloped legal system and significant commercial ties to the United States is augmented by the
fact that the Argentine Constitution was modeled very closely on the United States
Constitution.218
Since the end of the 19th century, Argentine law has offered the ability to sue individual
officials for harm that they cause in the course of their governmental functions.219 Although no
immunity is available to these officials, the remedy is obviously limited, because individual
officials are often unable to pay.
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Originally, victims of abuses had no recourse against the government directly. The
Supreme Court of Argentina, explicitly citing the jurisprudence of the United States courts,
adopted a strict sovereign immunity doctrine in 1864, completely precluding suit against the
government.220
Since that time, however, Argentine law has parted ways with the United States on the
issue of sovereign immunity. In 1933, the Supreme Court of Argentina decided the Devoto case,
which held that the government could be sued for the actions of its officials, including negligent
actions.221 The Court thus eliminated sovereign immunity and a previously-existing ban on
respondeat superior liability in one decision. Sovereign immunity has now ceased to be an
impediment to suits for damages against governmental actors.
A human rights victim may sue both the government and any individual officials
responsible for rights violations. Where the court awards damages against a government official,
the government is jointly liable.222
Argentine law generally requires a victim to establish some level of wrongdoing on the
part of government officials in order to establish governmental liability. The requirement can be
met in a number of ways – by establishing culpable or negligent actions of the officials or by
demonstrating that they carried out their official functions in an “irregular” manner.223
Responsibility of the government for the “irregular” conduct of its officials applies whenever the
government has assumed responsibility for a function, such as public security or public services,
and its officials cause harm or fail to prevent harm in the exercise of that function.224 The
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liability is so broad as to encompass official acts committed in times of war when they fail to
adhere strictly to the proper and limited nature of legitimate war powers.225
The Argentine system places emphasis on establishing the responsibility of individual
officials and imputing that responsibility to the government. However, the law also recognizes
that the central issue is the wrongful exercise of government authority. Thus, Argentine law
does not necessarily require the victim of human rights abuses to identify the individual officers
responsible for a violation or to describe with specificity their wrongdoing. Again, the fact that
the abuses occurred in the context of governmental actions is usually sufficient.226 For example,
the Supreme Court has held the government responsible for a police seizure of property even
where the victims could not identify the officers involved.227
The government may also be held directly responsible for certain executive and
legislative acts.228 In such cases, the victims of government action may simultaneously seek the
invalidation of the action as well as damages.229 In certain circumstances, as with the French
system, the government may be required to pay damages for its harmful actions even if they are
fully valid and lawful.230
The Argentine system has thus evolved to provide significant protection for victims of
human rights abuses. Individuals must cloak their claims in the language of civil law violations
(tort-like claims), such as abuse or usurpation of power or unlawful imprisonment, but they
regularly and successfully invoke the rights protections in the Argentine Constitution and
international human rights treaties to provide contour to those claims. In one such case decided
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in 1999, for example, Daniel Tarnopolsky brought a claim against the federal government and
against an individual military official seeking compensation for the disappearance of several of
his family members by the Argentine military during the dictatorship of the 1970s.231 The
Supreme Court of Argentina recognized the unique and tragic nature of disappearances and
issued a decision affirming an award of almost $2 million dollars. Despite the broad liability that
its legal system creates for governmental actors, Argentina has not deemed it necessary to revisit
the elimination of sovereign immunity protections.
V.

A Call for Change
If the United States wishes to hold itself forth as the international standard bearer for

human rights, it must remove sovereign immunity, including both governmental sovereign
immunity and qualified immunity, as a barrier to constitutional claims. Otherwise, the United
States may not claim that it provides effective human rights protections within the United States
and beam its model outward to the world as an example while limiting its own international
involvement in human rights.
A.

The Justifications Offered for Sovereign Immunity Should Fall

To convert the United States civil rights system into a human rights protection regime,
the right to compensation must override the justifications offered in support of sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity, including both governmental sovereign immunity and qualified
immunity, is justified in jurisprudence and commentary in the United States as necessary to: 1)
protect the public fisc and; 2) prevent the “over-deterrence” of official decision-making and
action that might result from the risk of litigation and liability.232
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The problem with these rationales for sovereign immunity is that they fail altogether to
take into account the right of victims of abuses to obtain compensation for harm they suffer at
the hands of the government. International human rights law, in no uncertain terms, requires
redress, including compensation, to be provided to victims of governmental abuses.233
The justification based on the risk of over-deterrence has never been substantiated in any
meaningful way and is inherently problematic. Presumably the Supreme Court wishes to avoid
under-deterrence of constitutional violations, as well as over-deterrence, by establishing a system
that provides the optimal level of deterrence. After all, an important goal of compensation for
governmental abuses, beyond providing redress to individual victims, is to ensure governmental
accountability and to deter future violations.234
Yet, the Supreme Court of the United States invokes the over-deterrence risk to justify
the qualified immunity available to government officials without explaining or supporting its
assertion that making government officials susceptible to suit would lead them to act with
excessive caution. It is just as plausible to argue that immunity leads government officials to be
unduly bold in their actions and thus causes under-deterrence of rights violations.235 Nor has the
Supreme Court ever addressed the possibility that a more appropriate level of deterrence could
be provided by taking the focus away from suits against individual officials and making
government itself liable. Scholars studying alternative liability systems for constitutional torts
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have suggested that government liability would provide the most effective level of deterrence.236
The system may require adjustment if for no other reason than to ensure adequate deterrence.
Even more clearly, the hypothetical risk of over-deterrence cannot weigh more heavily
than the right to redress of individual victims. Sovereign immunity prevents actual victims of
government excess from suing for compensation on the theory that government officials, in some
future instance, might otherwise refuse to take lawful action because of the specter of litigation.
International human rights law squarely categorizes that unfair denial of compensation as an
unacceptable State response to human rights violations.
The United States Supreme Court has also failed to explain why protection of the public
fisc is of such importance as to justify sovereign immunity protections against suit. The
Supreme Court has held that it is often desirable for the public at large, which benefits from the
existence of government, to pay for any harm caused by the government’s activities through the
public budget rather than allow individual victims of rights violations to suffer the impact
alone.237 The Supreme Court has never explained why, in the sovereign immunity context, it has
elected to put this distribution of cost theory aside in favor of protection of the public treasury.238
The preference for the treasury must give way in the face of the right to compensation
afforded to individuals under international human rights law. While the government may
properly be parsimonious with its funds elsewhere, it may not invoke sovereignty to refuse
payment to a victim who has suffered rights violations at the government’s own hands.239
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B.

Governmental Sovereign Immunity and Qualified Immunity for Officials
Should be Eliminated in Relation to Constitutional Claims

In order to eliminate sovereign immunity protections in cases involving constitutional
violations, the Supreme Court must act. Because the Supreme Court has held that sovereign
immunity has constitutional underpinnings,240 a legislative change would be ineffective in
overcoming all aspects of sovereign immunity. The United States Congress could ameliorate the
negative impact of sovereign immunity by taking steps such as amending the Federal Tort
Claims Act to waive explicitly and fully the federal government’s immunity from suit for
constitutional torts or by limiting or eliminating qualified immunity. However, congressional
action could only provide a piecemeal and partial solution in an area of the law already lacking
in coherency and is therefore unsatisfactory. Of course, a clearly stated constitutional
amendment could eliminate sovereign immunity, but the lengthy and uncertain amendment
process does not provide an attractive resolution to the urgent problem presented by the inability
of victims to obtain compensation for human rights violations. There is no doubt that the
Supreme Court could eliminate sovereign immunity through a revised interpretation of the
Constitution, since immunity is a judicially-created doctrine in the first place.241 The Supreme
Court should do so.
1.

The Full Elimination of Governmental Sovereign Immunity and the
Incorporation of Respondeat Superior Liability

Governmental sovereign immunity must be fully and completely eliminated in
constitutional cases in order to provide for greater human rights protection in the United States
legal system. Once governmental sovereign immunity is eliminated, most victims of civil rights
violations will choose to sue the government rather than individual officials. Suit against the
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government will provide the most direct and effective means of obtaining compensation for harm
caused by governmental actors.
To ensure that suit against the government is feasible, the elimination of sovereign
immunity for constitutional tort claims should include the acceptance of respondeat superior
liability.242 The unavailability of a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory to establish
government liability has always been closely linked to sovereign immunity and has had the same
effect of making it exceedingly difficult to secure government liability.243 The incorporation of a
ban on respondeat superior liability would thus defeat the purpose of eliminating sovereign
immunity. For the same reason that sovereign immunity is rejected, the theory of respondeat
superior liability should be available to individuals bringing civil rights tort claims against the
government just as it is available to litigants in other tort contexts.
2.

The Elimination of Qualified Immunity and Adoption of Joint Liability

The qualified immunity that protects government officials should also be eliminated. In
some cases, victims of civil rights violations might still wish to bring suit against individual
officials even after the elimination of governmental sovereign immunity. An individual
government official may have acted in a particularly egregious or personal manner such that the
victim wishes to identify the specific official as the perpetrator of a rights violation.244 As shown
above, qualified immunity makes it unacceptably difficult to secure the liability of a government
official even where constitutional rights are involved.
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The United States should adopt rules ensuring that the government will respond
financially, through the development of a joint liability rule, in all cases when damages are
imposed against individual officials who violate civil rights while acting within the scope of their
employment. In result, suits against individual officials might be more symbolic than real, since
payment would come from the government. However, that symbolism might be important for
victims of rights violations in some cases.
In this way, victims of rights violations will be guaranteed recovery of any compensation
to which they are entitled in suits against government officials. The system will appropriately
recognize that, regardless of the entity or individual sued, the ultimate obligation to guarantee
compensation remains with the government as is required under international human rights law.
By eliminating qualified immunity and providing for joint liability, the system will more fairly
and consistently recognize the reality that the government should and usually does respond for
suits against officials involving actions taken within the scope of government employment.245
At the same time, individual officers would be protected from financial ruin resulting
from liability for their official conduct.246 Any remaining concern about over-deterrence should
thus be resolved. If the government itself must pay for human rights violations even where the
suit is brought against an individual official, the risk largely disappears.247 The risk of under-
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deterrence might still exist, but at least any harm caused by constitutional violations that were
not prevented will not be borne by the victim but rather by the society as a whole.
C.

The Effect of the Elimination of Sovereign Immunity

Eliminating sovereign immunity does not mean that every use of force by the police,
every law enforcement entry into a private home or every arrest that fails to lead to conviction
will result in government liability in the United States courts. Every such act does not violate the
United States Constitution and therefore cannot result in liability even if sovereign immunity
does not apply.
1.

The Elimination of Sovereign Immunity does not Expand Substantive
Constitutional Rights

As discussed above, United States constitutional law imposes substantive standards that
must be met before a constitutional violation is found at all. Substantive civil rights law, as well
as substantive human rights law, recognizes the special nature of government and the activities it
pursues. The proposal for change set forth in this Section does not argue for any modification of
these substantive constitutional standards and does not therefore expand constitutional rights or
restrict government’s range of action. Instead, it seeks to ensure that current constitutional law
norms are respected and enforced and that compensation is available when they are not. The
elimination of sovereign immunity would simply allow governmental actors to be sued for
compensation when the substantive law requirements are met establishing that a civil
rights/human rights violation has taken place. In those cases, victims must be permitted to seek
compensation or the United States fails to provide adequate human rights protections.
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2.

Punitive Damages are not Required under International Human Rights Law

The elimination of sovereign immunity to ensure greater human rights protection does
not implicate any change in the rules on punitive damages applicable in the United States.
International human rights law does not, as it has developed until now, require that punitive
damages be awarded to victims of human rights violations.248 Punitive damages are provided in
addition to compensation for harm actually suffered, and international human rights law requires
only that victims of violations be made whole for the damages they actually suffered. The ability
of the United States system to provide human protections is therefore not undercut by continuing
to preclude punitive damages in constitutional claims against governmental entities.249 The very
strict limitations on the availability of punitive damages in constitutional claims against
individual officials may also be maintained.250
3.

The Elimination of Sovereign Immunity Need Not Cause a Backlash against
Rights

It is possible that the elimination of sovereign immunity might lead to a backlash of
increased substantive protection for the government.251 If sovereign immunity is not available to
protect governmental actors from suit, the courts and/or Congress might restrict substantive
rights so as to make claims for compensation less likely to succeed on the merits. To some
degree, the United States may properly modify the contours of the rights it protects. There is a
limit, however.252 The United States cannot deprive constitutional rights of real meaning as a
way of ensuring that victims will be unable to sue to obtain redress for governmental abuse even
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without sovereign immunity barriers. If the United States significantly diluted its rights
protections, it would not be appropriate to operate from the premise that the substantive
protections in domestic law closely match the protections provided for under international human
rights law. The theoretical availability of suit against the government for damages would no
longer make the United States civil rights system an effective human rights system if substantive
human rights protections no longer existed in United States constitutional law. The United
States can and should resist any temptation to dilute its substantive rights protections.
CONCLUSION
The United States must begin to accept that its domestic legal system is not perfect.
While the United States fairly boasts that the United States Constitution enshrines most
important human rights, the legal system does not provide adequate protections to ensure that
those rights are respected and that their violation results in redress. International human rights
law and comparative law provide an important perspective on the steps that the United States can
and must take to provide for more effective human rights protection in this country. One step of
vital and urgent importance is the elimination of all sovereign immunity doctrines from the
United States legal system. More generally, the problems with sovereign immunity laid out in
this Article demonstrate the fallacy of United States insistence that “everything is fine, thank
you,” in the United States. In general the United States should stop burrowing further into a hole
of defensiveness about the brilliance of its rights protections. Instead, the United States should
increase its receptiveness to the improvements that could be made by through active involvement
in the international human rights community and the acceptance of additional human rights
commitments. The United States will be better, not worse, for the change.
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